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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview of Chinese economic transition and SOEs’ reforming 
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping gave the slogan for the Chinese development strategy which 
was crossing the river by groping for the stones. Since then China opened its door to foreign 
trade and investment. One of the first step for reforms was reduction of land collectivization 
introducing the principle of household responsibility in agriculture. The second step was 
increasing the role of local government and communities. The third was making experiments 
of market reforms in a few selected special economic zones (SEZs). China’s transition to some 
degree can be track down precisely by the process of SOE reform. There are four phases: fiscal 
decentralization and expanding SOE autonomy, then issued dual track system and contract 
responsibility system, after that market economy and corporatization took place, and finally 
privatization. During the first ten years of reforms to 1988, per capita income in China doubled. 
After that, due to 1989’s inflationary and political crisis, the central government of China 
implemented a severe program intended to constraint inflation and to reinforce the economy’s 
industrial structure. Since the 1990s, China is included in the intimation division of labor within 
East Asia at the same time as ASEAN-4. This was also a consequence of the economic re-
adjustment in Asian NIEs. China had some characteristics from both South Korea and Malaysia 
in economic transformation such as open-door and liberalization policies underpinned by 
export-oriented FDI. But because of the differences in initial conditions and historical legacies 
between China other East Asian Miracle economies, the path of development was different. 
Comparing with South Korea and Malaysia, the stated owned enterprises still have the major 
share of the economy; export oriented policies were mainly restricted to particular area 
especially eastern coastal cities; the untapped financial market has been keeping transnational 
finance capital flowing freely; tremendous FDI was brought by small and medium size capital 
of overseas Chinese; created quasi-private rural industry in TVEs supported the growth of labor 
intensive industries. With the transition went on, the role of state-owned industrial enterprises 
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in China has been persistently upgrading. (Xiazhe 2012) At the year of 1980, SOEs played as 
the central role of China's industrial sector, accounting about 57% of industrial employment 
and 76% of gross industrial output (China Statistical Yearbook 1999, Chapter 5). In 1978, the 
state-owned enterprises share 77% of total industrial output, however only 49.6% till 1998. The 
gains of industrial state-owned enterprises were 15% of GDP in 1978 and only left less than 2% 
of GDP till 1997. By 2004, only a few of SOEs remained in the original form and still some 
38% of industrial production was being made by companies which were classified as state-
owned and with corporations of the majority of whose shares were had by central government 
and local governments. It seems that more state-own enterprises will have other types of shares 
in their board including private shares. (Li, Weiye and Putterman, 2008) 
 
The sources of China’s growth are partially reflected in the ownership sectors where 
investment is occurring. Till the 1990s, Chinese economy has been transformed into an 
economy which has dual structure. However, the concept of private sector was not clear during 
that time. In Chinese official statistics, all non-SOEs are belong to the so called private sector. 
It contains enterprises which are certainly government owned in fact. Others are sole 
proprietorships, private enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises. Some scholars describes the 
private sector as the “fundamental driving force in China's economic growth…in maintaining 
economic and social stability; as a source of technological innovation; in resisting recession 
and accelerating economic recovery after the Asian financial crisis; in re-employment of urban 
laid-off workers, and in relief for rural poverty and farmers' incomes.” (Wu 2006) These sectors 
which composed of FIEs and private enterprises played a major role of Chinese economic 
transformation. At the same time, the state sector focused on heavy industry and created a high 
percentage of gross domestic fixed capital formation, gross output value and the number of 
employees. In 1995, the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP 
implemented the policy of "grasp the large and release the small". As a consequence, 
government selected the medium and large-scale high-technology industry and the security-
related sector from SOEs as strategic sectors. However, according to the comparative advantage 
theorists the State Development and Planning Commission suggested that the state should pay 
more attention on developing firms with intermediate-level technology. In order to reinforce 
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the dominance of large-sized SOEs have the capacity to compete in the world market, the 
industrial re-adjustment policy was created to promote strategic industries with intermediate-
level technology. 
 
This new movement led to joblessness of millions normal workers in SOEs, urban collective 
companies, and even government offices and public service units. Such huge shock began in 
1995, and last four years after that from 1996 to 1999 with an average of seven million 
employees drop annually. (Dong and Xu, 2009) Based on a historical panel survey of 683 
enterprises in 11 cities, till the end of 2001, 86% of all state-owned enterprises had gone through 
the new restructuring process called “gaizhi” (changing system), which had various forms, 
including public listing of shares and corporatization, internal restructuring, sale shares, joint 
ventures, and bankruptcy. 27% of mid-size and large-scale SOEs applied employee 
shareholding, 28% of them were leased out or sold to private owners, 20% went through 
restructuring within firms’ itself, 8% began with ownership diversification including private 
placement or public offerings to outside investors, 4% became joint ventures, and the rest 13% 
of SOEs had been through debt-equity swaps or bankruptcy in this survey. About more than 70% 
of these cases, “gaizhi” included the transfer of at least a portion of ownership from the nation 
to private hands. Nevertheless the released small state-owned enterprises and the large scale of 
laid off workers from SOEs, the state still to be the biggest shareholder in firms accounting for 
21% and state-owned enterprises continued to account for 11% of China's industrial output in 
2004. (Garnaut et al., 2005, pp. 50–51)  
1.2 Current state of SOEs 
According to OECD Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Assets, a narrow definition of SOEs which “state-owned enterprises” refers to business 
entities established by central and local governments, and whose supervisory agencies are from 
the government had been used in official statistics during prior-reform period. This definition 
only includes wholly state-funded companies, therefore it has some statistical limitations. The 
current definition of SOEs which includes state-owned and state-holding enterprises has been 
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used since 1995. State-owned and state-holding enterprises refer to state-owned enterprises and 
also state-holding enterprises, where state-owned enterprises are above-mentioned completely 
state-funded companies and the conception of “state-holding enterprises” is which that they are 
some firms whose majority shares belong to the government meanwhile they also involves other 
types of share, for instance private share. The new definition of SOEs is primarily used in the 
following statistics on industrial enterprises, as published in the China Statistical Yearbook and 
so on. Since the mid-1990s, data sources from China include all state-owned and state-holding 
companies which also reflects privatization reform. (OECD, 2009) 
 
In order to have a better understanding about current state of this broad definition of SOEs, 
several tables and figures have been shown below. From the perspective of the relative 
employed workers size and assets scale, industrial SOEs are comparatively larger than private 
and foreign counterparts. When it comes to the per capita asset size, SOEs tend to be stay in 
more capital intensive area. Plus, after 1998 SOEs has developed significantly toward the higher 
capital intensity. According to this table, despite of profitability which calculated by ROA index 
has been weaker than private firms and foreign companies, SOEs’ performance has become 
better and better. In another word SOEs’ ROA has risen from 0.7% in 1998 to 6.3% in 2006. 
Based on the movement of SOEs’ per capita value added, in 1998 SOEs’ was only 29555.9 
(yuan) while in 2006 was 180647.5 (yuan) which shows that the corporate performance of SOEs 
has obviously increased in a relatively high speed compare to private and foreign firms during 
these 9 years (see table 1). 
Table 1. Performances of Industrial SOEs, 1998-2006  
Industrial State-Owned Enterprises 
Year Average 
Asset size 
(million 
yuan) 
Average  
number of  
employees 
ROA 
(%) 
Asset 
Liability 
Ratio 
(%) 
Per Capita  
Value 
added  
(yuan) 
Per Capita  
Asset  
(yuan) 
1998 115.7 578.9 0.7 47.6 29,555.9 199,895.1 
2002 216.6 589.3 3.0 59.3 65,748.6 367,608.1 
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2006 541.5 722.7 6.3 56.2 180,647.5 749,187.1 
Industrial Foreign Enterprises 
1998 80.7 293.2 2.0 58.5 52,310.7 275,119.0 
2002 91.4 305.9 6.0 54.4 81,312.5 298,895.6 
2006 126.7 348.0 7.0 56.3 120,607.1 364,046.3 
Industrial Private Enterprises 
1998 13.9 150.7 4.5 61.2 31,693.4 92,473.9 
2002 17.8 149.0 5.6 59.3 44,423.9 119,520.0 
2006 27.1 131.6 7.9 59.1 95,057.2 205,553.7 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2007 
 
 Also based on the China Statistical Yearbook’s definition of SOE, given table below shows 
state-owned enterprises’ large share scale in the overall Chinese stock market (see table 2). 
During 1995-2007, SOEs share among total domestic stock market capitalization increased 
from 73.1% to 83.1% which equals to 10%. The reason of increasing trend of SOEs share in 
stock capitalization is due to the process of SOEs’ reform. Such movement accelerated state-
owned enterprises to change their structure into shareholding ones which also have the 
possibility of increasing percentage of private share within the firm. 
Table 2. SOEs’ share among total Chinese stock market capitalization 
Year Volume of market capitalization 
(100 million yuan) 
SOEs’ share 
(%) 
Overall market SOEs 
1995 3,867 
(311) 
2,826 
(211) 
73.1 
1999 27,974 
(923) 
19,421 
(626) 
69.4 
2003 45,255 
(1,266) 
37,108 
(928) 
82.0 
2007 400,409 332,769 83.1 
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(1,516) (936) 
Source: CSMAR database  
Note: All of the A-stock firms in the Chinese stock market are included in above table. 
Figures in brackets are the number of enterprises referred. 
 
From a comparative scope to acquaint ourselves with current state of SOEs, we can observe 
through this figure 1 shown below that Chinese No.1 SOE Sinopec has 10 times operating 
income than No.1 PE Huawei in 2010. Hence, Huawei as No.1 PE only ranks No.39 among 
China’s top 500 enterprises. That means beyond Huawei, there are still 38 companies had 
greater operating income, among them state-owned enterprises are the majority. According to 
this figure, we can obviously see how tremendous are the SOEs by looking at their operating 
income.  
Figure 1. Operating income of Sinopec and Huawei in 2010 
 
Source: www.CNPolitics.org, 2010; author’s calculations 
 To sum up, Chinese state-owned enterprises still are the back bone of this country’s economy. 
In consideration of such large scale of SOEs with persistent increasing in the corporate 
performance, share in stock capitalization and so forth, a study on SOEs’ operating efficiency 
can make a significant contribution, as understanding how percentage of private share affect 
SOEs’ performances. 
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1.3 Aim of the study 
After series of SOE’s reform, it is true that SOEs still remain the most important part of the 
Chinese economy, particularly among certain strategically main sectors, for instance 
telecommunications industry, infrastructure construction, natural energy and raw materials, 
financial services sector and so forth. Therefore, the operating efficiencies of SOEs have 
remarkable impact on China’s economy growth as well as in the global circumstance. What’s 
more, with the reform process moves on, the percentage of private shares and board system take 
place in more and more state-owned companies. This study aim to dig into the dynamics that 
how private share percentage in SOE affect its operating efficiency. Then give a discussion 
about should the central government continue to keep the largest and most important SOEs 
under control or should we go on with increasing SOEs’ private share percentage? Based on Li, 
Weiye and Putterman’s research overview, the certain year 2004 is chosen to address this 
research question because only a few of SOEs kept in the original form and 38% of industrial 
production was being created by companies that were classified as state-owned and with 
corporations of other type ownership of whose shares were had by managers or public while 
the majority shareholders are central government and local governments. As far as I’m concern, 
this year is the watershed of SOEs’ performances to get much better. Therefore state-owned 
enterprises’ data from National Bureau of Statistics NBS [2004] which including figures of 
SOEs’ private share percentages is used. This dataset was collected in 2004 by National Bureau 
of Statistics in China which is about an investment climate survey for all kinds of companies. 
It will focus on the percentage of private shares in state-owned enterprises, due to the method 
of using micro-data and the limitation of the dataset. 
  
After overviewing the Chinese economic transition and SOEs’ reforming and elaborating the 
current state of SOEs, the structure of the thesis will be presented as follows: section 2 will be 
research qustion with hypothesis, precisely defining what the thesis engage to find out. Section 
3 presents previous literature review with theoretical foundation, section 4 is the empirical 
method part, in this part first I’ll introduce the reason that the dataset is chosen, in what way 
I’ll use it and also the limitation of this dataset. Then it comes to data selected and statistical 
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description part. After that it will be the model specified for econometric analyses based on 
research question. Finaly, in section 5 I’ll summarize the results and discussions, and draw the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Research Question and Hypothesis 
State-owned enterprises’ operating efficiencies does percentage of private share matter? 
From a broad perspective of companies’ level, there are many aspects of indicators with state-
owned enterprises can be tested with the degree of privatization’s influence on firms’ operating 
efficiency. Notice that this paper does not analyze the whole extent of privatization but one 
simple aspect which the percentage of private ownership’s influence on state-owned enterprises. 
Such as company’s profitability, its operating efficiency and so on. These are the most important 
indicators which can present a company’s performance. This paper only focus on the correlation 
of operating efficiency and private share percentage in state-owned enterprises. 
 
In order to test the correlation between the operating efficiency of SOEs and private share 
percentage, this paper brings up some hypotheses. Come to light, when SOEs’ managers and 
employees are faced the improvement of private share percentage, they are subject to a hard 
budget constraint. In addition, they are pressed to improve operating efficiency so that they can 
maximize sales proceeds and income. This is due to the social interest is focused on the 
operating efficiency of SOEs, people who work in this company care more about benefits than 
the fulfillment of plans or programs given by government, which in turn of hardens the budget 
constraint. Therefore, no more mistakes are allowed for managers and employees to make. As 
a consequence SOE’s operating efficiency will be deeply accelerated. Based on this mechanism, 
the expectation is that the growth of private share percentage will have positive impact on the 
operating efficiency.  
 
However, the measurement of operating efficiency usually include two aspects which are 
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output side and input side. For the former, this paper used sales per employee as output 
efficiency. For the latter, it used net income per employee as input efficiency. In a business 
context, operating efficiency can be defined as the ratio between the input side to run a business 
operation and also the output side obtained from the business. When operating efficiency is 
improved, the output to input ratio improves. In order to improve operating efficiency, one has 
to start by measuring it. As far as I’m concerned, since operating efficiency is about the output 
to input ratio, it should be measured both on the input and the output side. Therefore, this paper 
will do a director test by using two indicators, sales efficiency and net income efficiency. In 
other word my hypotheses have two sides:  
H1: growth of private share percentage improves state-owned companies’ sale efficiency  
H2: growth of private share percentage is conducive to state-owned companies’ income 
efficiency 
 
 
3. Previous researches review and theoretical foundation 
When it comes to the discussions of state-owned enterprises’ operating efficiency, why 
countries need SOEs to be their pillar should be initially figured out. There are many factors 
for keeping state-owned enterprises running. For instance, Friedman and Garner named four 
reasons which are defensive construction, controlling monopoly industries, ideological 
predilection from politicians and promotion or acceleration of economic development. 
(Friedman and Garner 1970) Many scholars also brought about some same ideas to explain the 
reason of state-owned enterprises’ appearance. Those previous studies of SOE’s establishment 
all have a common point which was addressed to public interest rationales. Based on their theory, 
the establishment SOEs were called of social requirement. With regard to SOEs’ inefficient 
performances, Friedman and Garner used “soft budget constraint” theory to explain. In their 
opinion, the main reason of inefficiency in state-owned enterprises is because these SOEs rely 
too much on the government. Their bad loan or non-performing loan can be easily solved by 
using funding from official agencies, this phenomenon leads to soft budget constrain. Due to 
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specific target or strategically purpose, government will not to allow a large scale of SOE to 
shut down. Therefore, the hard budget constraint which private companies suffer by the 
competitive markets and the worries of financial deficit barely have influences on state-owned 
enterprises. Plus, if some percentage of private share increase in SOEs, the owners of private 
share will also suffer from the risk of loss, then these kind of SOEs’ budget constraint will be 
“harden”. As a consequence, they will find way to improve company’s operating efficiency in 
order to avoid bankruptcy. Therefrom, I assume percentage of private share has positive impact 
on SOEs’ operating efficiency.  
 
However, along with a huge number of SOEs operating in China, more and more researchers 
viewed these companies’ bad performance critically. In order to improve SOEs’ performances, 
one of the most efficient way is to privatize state-owned enterprises gradually. Some theories 
support privatization of SOEs, for example property rights theory by Harold Demsetz, agency 
theory by Jensen and Meckling and public choice by Niskanen. According to Cuervo and 
Villalonga’s summary, the agency theory think that general managers seek to maximize their 
own profits rather than that of the owners of the company or the company itself. Nonetheless, 
general managers in private enterprise are constrained by a number of external control 
mechanisms, such as the market environment for managers, and also by internal control 
mechanisms, such as rewards incentives and compensation. (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) 
According to property right theory which raised by Harold Demsetz, if a company get more 
percent of private share, those people who are related to such share will have worries about bad 
performance of their company. Therefore, they will hardly seek their own advantages but get 
incentives to maximize profits. (Harold Demsetz 1967) Based on property right theory, I 
obtained the theoratical foundtion to study the influence of private share percent on state-owned 
enterprise’s operating efficiency. To be more specific, to find out the correlation between state-
owned enterprises’ private share percent and their operating performances.While in addition to 
aforementioned property right theory which comes from Harold Demsetz, most criticism 
focused on the lack of property rights protection. When it comes to public choice theory, it’s 
more about the government network. State-owned enterprises’ managers are usually more care 
about maximizing their own power, their reputations, and the amount of resources under their 
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control. (Niskanen, 1971) Sonja Opper argued that property right theory is not the single factor 
of the global movement to privatize state-owned enterprises. She pointed out that the political 
decisions to privatize and implement the relevant programs are not a consequence of economic 
efﬁciency calculations alone. The public choice theory and interest group theories also need to 
be considered into account. She goes on in explaining that these two approaches are the key 
role to be with the related stakeholders (interest groups and politicians), which duly accounts 
for the fact that a change in formal institutions such as property rights is shaped decidedly by 
societal disputes over the given distribution of resources. (Sonja Opper 2004) Comprehensive 
the above point of view, inspite of persistent debating between property right theory, public 
choice theory and agency theory, even interest group theory and so on, all the theories have a 
common point that privatization has significant influence on SOEs’ operating effitiency 
regardless of whether positive or negative. These theories support the idea which to exam SOEs’ 
private share percentage’s impact on SOEs’ performance as one aspect of privatization. 
 
Through the last 30 years, many researchers have viewed that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
should be privatized while others have an opposite idea that it should be a more gradual reform 
approache. At the beginning of this debate, scholars were interested in (governance intervention) 
ownership structure which they believed was the crucial factor of state-owned enterprises’ 
inefficiency. However, as decades of research went through, both supporters and opponents of 
privatization have come to notice that the importance of market structure and managerial 
objectives. Therefore, some argued that it need to pay more attentions to how government could 
achieve performance-oriented goals and competitive market conditions as well on SOEs’s 
operation. While those who agreed with privatization thought that privatization is the only 
method to bring about changes in managerial goals and towards competitive environment, 
others maintained that it can be accomplished by more gradual approaches. Stuck in the 
controversy, policy makers from government were often left with little policy options but to 
continue with traditional SOE policies. The situation in China is very similar where a 
tremendous state-owned enterprises’ sector has been criticized for its performance and the 
government has been hard pressed to find ways to enhance their performances through the 
economic transition. Therefore, some researchers tried to explain that only obey political goals 
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is a main incentive for SOEs’ general managers and this lead to state-owned enterprises’ 
performance inefficiency. 
 
According to Simeon Djankov and Peter Murrell, “the classical state-owned enterprise by 
definition was oriented to an input-output plan rather than any market. Achieving the plan was 
of main importance and the plan was normally very ambitious. Thus, production issues 
dominated entrepreneurship, marketing, and cost minimization in managerial concerns. As a 
result, the typical manager was a production engineer and not a businessman. Managers faced 
a mix of monetary and career-based incentives, which were a function of plan fulfillment, 
enterprise performance, and political loyalty Profits and efficiency were much less important 
than they are under capitalism.” (Simeon Djankov and Peter Murrell 2002) This thought has its 
own validity, when a person or a group of people is driven by political goals, their decision will 
mainly serve for government’s targets which might not be the best to get profit for instance as 
aforementioned managers. Relatively speaking, with the process of SOEs reform, some people 
who are able to have shares in SOEs will make decisions which are market oriental. In 
consideration of such idea, when dealing with SOE’ operating efficiency whether it has a board 
of director to some degree can be regarded as a important indicator. With the process of 
economy reform, I asume that managers and shareholders will become more and more market 
orinental. As a consequence, whether a SOE has a board of director will have significant 
influence on its performance. 
 
Since 1979 China started its economic reform, its economy has experienced one of the most 
spectacular growths in recent decades. Even though property rights protection of private didn’t 
formally exist in China’s constitution until March 2004, the majority of China’s economic 
growth has been driven by its private enterprises. Chinese government realized that industries 
serve for political goals were losing position in the global economy. Economic growth was 
blocked and living standards were not improving. State-owned enterprises then have been 
trying to restructure their property arrangement. It is known that Chinese government has used 
a variety of methods to transform state-owned enterprise. For instance, during the early 1990s, 
government sold shares of state-owned enterprises through public stock exchanges which were 
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newly established at that time. Moreover, they sold shares to general managers in the companies. 
These two methods above led to an increasing of private share percentage in state-owned 
enterprises. However, many empirical evidences have been found in a vast of literatures which 
usually focus on two sides. On the one hand, to compare the relative performances of private 
companies and public firms. On the other hand, to compare the operating efficiency of the state-
owned enterprises from pre-privaization time to post-privatization time. For the fommer, Kim 
Junki drew a conclusion that the operating efficiencies of privately owned companies are 
generally much better than those of SOEs and partially privatized enterprises (Kim 2007). For 
the latter, Magginson and Netter’s survey confirmed that the increasing in company’s 
profitability (both operating income to total assets and operating income to sales) was 
significant after these listed companies went through the process of privatization. For instance, 
they analysis this issue from three perspectives which includes characteristic of nations, region 
and technique to privatize then they found evidence to supporte the idea that with more degree 
of privatization public companies are much more efficient and more profitable than otherwise 
comparable previous state. (Magginson and Netter 2001) According to their result, I asume that 
the current gradual reform in China has a positive effect on companies with incresed private 
share percentage especilly for state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless as listed literatures in their 
survey, a comparation of SOEs’ operating efficiencies with different private share percentage is 
seldom found. If a dataset is used to do such comparation, then maybe I can get a new result 
which different from above-mentioned two research directions. In other words, I can obtain 
how percentage of private share affect state-owned enterprises’ operating efficiency. 
 
Some scholars tried to use another empirical approach to do research on the influences of 
state ownership on firm performances by using a multi-industry, cross-national, time-series 
methodology. For instance, Boardman and Vining examined the operating performance of the 
500 largest non-U.S. industrial companies in 1983. They used four profitability ratios with two 
measures of X-efficiency. Then they drew conclusions which privately owned companies are 
much more profitable and productive than mixed state-private ownership firms and state-owned 
ones. The other finding is that SOEs’ profitability will be weaken by mixing ownership type 
(private part increasing). Therefore, they suggested that government should conduct full private 
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control instead of partial ownership in order to achieve performance improvement. (Boardman 
and Vining, 1989) The generally same method was used in Dewenter and Malatesta’s research 
by using more recent dataset. Basically, they examined whether the labor force, income ability 
and debt levels of state-owned enterprises in the 500 largest international firms, which were 
reported in Fortune separately in 1975,1985 and 1995, differ from privately owned companies 
in the same samples. In this study, they controlled for firm size, location, industry, and business-
cycle effects and again obtained a result that model of private firms is better than state-owned 
one. (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2000) Although their efforts were put more into private versus 
state-owned, they provided approaches to study on firm level performances by using cross-
section time series data. Furthermore, the significant choice of controlling for firm size, location, 
industry, and business-cycle effects is very worth considering.   
 
Some scholars tested that how the profits of privatization might change with respect to the 
types of new, non-state ownership. (Frydman, Gary, Hessel and Rapaczynski 1999) There also 
exist other types of privatization and restructuring in China, such as share-issuing privatization 
(Wang, Xu and Zhu 2004), shareholding ownership (Jefferson and Su, 2005) and so forth. 
Above research all have some common points in micro-level of ownership changing within 
state-owned enterprises or in Chinese privatization context. They used different dataset and 
method to test, due to the quality of data source or examining approaches, some of their results 
are insignificant. Another interesting research was conducted by Bai, Lu and Tao, which is 
about non-state ownership percentage’s influence on SOEs’ performance. This study provided 
an obvious empirical evidence to support increasing in non-state ownership percentage 
accelerate SOEs’ efficiency. In their article they found firstly the logarithm of total assets 
dropped but the logarithm of sales increased with the extent of privatization, secondly the 
operating income to sales and operating income to total assets increased with the percentage of 
non-state ownership and thirdly both operating income per employee and sales per employee 
increased with the degree of privatization. According to their work, they focused on a sub-
sample of 15,496 enterprises which were 100% state-owned in 1998. There were 12,630 of 
them remained fully state-owned ownership until 2003 and 2,866 of them were privatized to 
various extent by 2003. (Bai, Lu and Tao 2005) They inspired me with such idea that any 
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reduction in state ownership is referred to as privatization. In addition, they didn’t classify 
privatization by the types of new capital, which might be private ownership, collective one, 
HMT ownership, or foreign invested one. Hence, from my study based on the data source of 
National Bureau of Statistics NBS [2004], I’m able to exam classified private share percentage’s 
influence on state-owned enterprises’ operating efficiency. Compare to their study, this thesis 
focus on more micro-level and accurate aspect.  
 
Similarly, an empirical case study on the performance of state-owned enterprises and the 
privatizing pressure was conducted by Junki Kim and Hongkyou Chung. In their study, based 
on budget constraint theory, they tested if the government imposition of hard budget constraint 
on state-owned enterprises has impact on their operations or not. (J.Kim and H.Chung,2007) 
Firstly, they compare 22 Koean state-owned enterprises’ performance through two periods 
which are under the privatization pressure and subject to little privatization pressure. Secondly, 
they used time-series and cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis with a dataset from 22 
Korean SOEs. The result of this study is that statistically significant positive correlation does 
existe between the privatization pressure and the operating efficiency of SOEs. However, in 
their entire research, the dependent variable privatization pressure was design as a dummy 
variable with 0 stands for the Roh administration (with out privatization pressure) and with 1 
stands for the Kim administration (under privatization pressure). In my opinion, the conception 
of privatization pressure is relatively vague and lack of gragual changing. Due to different 
policy adjustments,the degree of privatization is a floating indicator. It might be better if one 
study on precise aspect such as private share percentage’s impact on state-owned enterprises’ 
efficiency. Keeping their metod opinion in mind, to control the macroeconomic factors and 
other firm characteristics, I believe that a cross-section data regression is needed. Not only for 
controlling characteristics and macroeconomic factors but also to find out variables’ causality 
in the best way. Different from their methodology, in this paper only cross-section dataset is 
used in order to focus on certain year and also due to data source limitation. 
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4. Empirical Method 
4.1 Research Design 
In order to pursue the aim of the study, this research will be conducted in a quantitative way 
that based on a series of micro-level dataset analyses by the cross-sectional design. Micro data 
or survey are individual level data, for instance data about individual people. In a typical survey 
dataset, each row represents an individual person and each column an attribute such as age, 
gender or job-type. (http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/elearning/limmd/materials/LIMMD-
unit5/glossary.html) When it comes to cross-sectional research design “entails the collection of 
data on more than one case and at a single point in time in order to collect a body of quantitative 
or quantifiable data in connection with two or more variables, which are then examined to detect 
patterns of association” (Bryman, 2008 pp.44). 
 
The data used in this paper consist of the investment climate surveys for company managers, 
accountants and HR managers of the company as well as city information from the National 
Bureau of Statistics in 2004. The dataset is a cross-sectional dataset that covering 12400 
companies in 120 cities. In each second level city there are 100 numbers of observations, for 
the first level cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing from which there are 200 
observations each. Discussions about dataset will be shown in following chapter. As mentioned 
before, a cross-section data regression is needed so that I can control characteristics and 
macroeconomic factors in order to find out the causality between percentage of private share 
and state-owned enterprises in the best way. Since the dataset is collected from three survey 
reports in other words information is answered by individual respondents, thus, from a 
perspective of social science some figures from these survey may accompanied by subjective 
views to some degree. Therefore, in order to minimize the influence on subjective views when 
this research is design to deal with objective indicators from these surveys such as firm size, 
firm age and sector and so forth. 
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4.2 Data Selection 
To address this research question, state-owned enterprises’ data from National Bureau of 
Statistics NBS [2004] is used. This dataset was collected in 2005 by National Bureau of 
Statistics in China which is consist of two investment climate surveys for all kinds of companies’ 
(state-owned, collective, corporation, private, foreign) general managers, accounts and HR 
managers and city information in 2004. As an agency directly under the State Council’s control, 
the National Bureau of Statistics is in charge of statistics and economic accounting in China. 
The National Bureau of Statistics of China can public China Monthly Statistics, China Monthly 
Economic Indicators and China Statistical Yearbook and so forth. These publications present 
national level, provincial level, city level and even individual level states including economy, 
society, region and all other aspects of statistical data. The National Bureau Statistics of China 
provides comprehensive data bases that can reflect both economic and social development 
current situation for the People’s Republic of China every year. (Functions and Organizational 
Structure of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2007) 
 
By looking at the dataset of the National Bureau Statistics investment climate survey, we can 
have many data source based on interviewee’s answer. In the first part that is about 
questionnaires for general managers in all kinds of companies in China which generally 
concludes basic company information for instance major type of activity, investment factors 
impeding firm growth, relation with both input and output side and so forth. From first survey 
part, I selected data of do company have a board of director, the year the company established, 
major type of activity and city the company located from information on general manager and 
board of directors section. The second part is about questionnaire for accountants and HR 
managers in the company that consist of ownership information, financial statement and labor 
statics and so on. In the second survey, I choose data of ownership structure (percentage owned) 
from ownership and shareholding information section. Meanwhile, I selected data of total sale 
and income from financial statement section. In addition, I took data of total employment from 
labor statistics section. The third part is city information collected from the local governments. 
I encode cities of these companies located by making use of city information data. So far, factors 
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and indicators that I want to use in this research question are sufficiently supported by these 
three investment climate surveys and city information dataset from the National Bureau 
Statistics of China. Therefore, based on data collected from aforementioned NBS survey, both 
of the hypotheses that are raised in this paper are testable. 
 
4.3 Data Validity and Limitation 
However, when using dataset for quantitative analysis, it have to be relatively criticized about 
materials from Chinese questionnaires and data sources. Those questions about whether the 
Chinese official statistics are reliable or not seems to be a historical debate among researchers.  
 
According to OECD Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Assets aforementioned differences between Chinese official definitions of SOEs from 
pre-privatization period to pro-privatization period are discussed. The narrow definition of 
SOEs which “state-owned enterprises” refers to business entities established by central and 
local governments, and whose supervisory agencies are from the government had been used in 
official statistics during prior-reform period. This definition only includes wholly state-funded 
companies, therefore data analysis and studies that based on this period should be criticized 
more due to some conceptual limitations. The current definition of SOEs which includes state-
owned and state-holding enterprises has been used since 1995. State-owned and state-holding 
enterprises refer to state-owned enterprises and also state-holding enterprises, where state-
owned enterprises are above-mentioned completely state-funded companies and the conception 
of “state-holding enterprises” is which that they are some firms whose majority shares belong 
to the government meanwhile they also involves other types of share, for instance private share. 
(OECD, 2009) The reason why NBS 2004 is chosen to study SOEs’ private share percentage is 
well supported by this opinion. All the data collected from SOEs in NBS 2004 includes newly 
defined SOEs. Therefore, the validity of this dataset is insured from the definition aspect. 
 
From the perspective of data selection, all the indicators that are chosen in this research are 
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objective data, for instance firm age, total firm sale, total firm employment and so forth. In this 
paper, some general problems that caused by social actions and subjective views in survey data 
are artificially avoided. Even if the individual respondents answered question face-to-face, the 
data selection method can make sure the objectivity and validity of this study. When it comes 
to validity of NBS data source itself, as is stipulated in the Statistical Law, the State establishes 
a centralized and unified statistical system by instituting the statistical management system 
featuring unified leadership and decentralized administration. Government statistical agencies 
and personnel shall exercise their functions of statistical survey, reporting and supervision 
according to the law without any infringement. The Chinese government also devotes major 
efforts to publicize the significance of statistical work amongst the public, popularize 
elementary statistical knowledge and promote the awareness of citizens and legal entities of 
their obligation to report statistical information as well as their responsibility in case of violation 
of statistical laws. As a consequence, citizens and legal entities alike show a high degree of 
support and cooperation in Statistical activities. (Functions and Organizational Structure of the 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2007) 
 
Here I cite an empirical evidence to state data validity does exist in Chinese official statistics. 
Gregory C. Chow wrote a paper about lessons from studying the Chinese economy to prove 
that it is possible to do economic forecasts because of validity of econometric models and 
parameter stability. With the Chinese official statistics, he successfully made the forecasting of 
the overheating of the Chinese macro-economy in 2004 and inflation in later years. (Gregory 
C. Chow, 2009) There are many more evidences showing that Chinese official statistics is 
reliable. 
 
  However, this thesis is defined as the analysis on domestic micro-data instead of group or 
macro-level data which cross countries. Although the influence of privatization on SOEs’ 
performance as a whole is discussed both practically and theoretically by previous researches, 
for the variables and figures are still relatively narrow as to study private share percentages’ 
impact on SOEs’ operating efficiency. Therefore, the thesis has limitations on both data source 
and study scope. In other word, my result can only focus on phenomenon explanation rather 
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than analyze entire institutional reform. The content of research is further narrowed down to 
the base number of SOEs is comparatively larger than target SOEs (those have private share 
percentage). The scale of sample size directly relate to the applied range of empirical testing 
result. That is to say, sometimes the final outcome might be over fitted. Another limitation exists 
in data available that NBS investment climate survey 2004 is the most recent and fitted dataset 
for this study which is accessible. What’s more, due to cross-section data is used, this study 
might face the time frame limitation because the survey was conducted in 2004. Generally 
speaking, this research’s assumption is based on several significant theory and data also can be 
considered as comprehensive and accurate. Though the final result to some degree can only 
focus on relatively narrow aspect due to the limitations. Or even some results might not be 
statistically significant due to some low reliability level variables. Nevertheless I believe that 
the anticipation of this study will generally match soft budget constraint and institutional theory. 
Despite the limitations of the dataset, I can still expect it to reflect certain correlation between 
private share percentage and SOEs’ operating efficiency. In addition, when we get better 
understanding of limitations then the results and conclusions of the research can be applied in 
more valid and fitted field. 
 
4.4 Data Management 
This paper is interested in estimating effect of private share percentage on operating 
efficiency of state-owned enterprises. In order to arrive at two previously mentioned hypothesis, 
the following parts will provide a presentation of the dependent variables, independent variables 
and control variables followed by the model specification and a description of the variables. At 
first selection, observations are dropped which thoroughly have no influence on my research 
and some observations are partially restricted. For instance in register status only SOEs are 
maintained and other eight ownership types are exclude because this research is focused on 
state-owned enterprise. In the second step, this paper inspected into those factors which are kept 
in dataset. Some missing values and wrong coded variables are dropped. Some outliers are 
excluded for later research. For the main indicator of this research which is the private share 
 23 
 
percentage, it is found that only a few SOEs have private share when they are compared with 
the total number. Therefore those SOEs which do not have private shares are excluded. 
 
 
Dependent Variables Based on the definition of operating efficiency as in most papers about 
SOE performance, including Magginson et al. (1994), Wei et al. (2003), and Kim (2007), sales 
efficiency which equals company’s real sale in 2004 is used to divide that year’s total 
employment. For input side, income efficiency that equals the core business income in 2004 
divide that year’s total employment is used as a proxy of total output efficiency giving us 
income per employee to measure firm profitability (Li 1998; Li and Xia 2008). Both of these 
dependent variables are continuous variables, missing values and wrong code variables are 
drooped. 
 
Independent Variables When it comes to independent, or explanatory variable, private share 
percentage as the percentage of private ownership in state-owned enterprises’ ownership 
structure part is picked as independent measurement. Our independent variable is also a 
continuous variable. Those SOEs don’t have private share percentage are dropped, in other 
words, if the value of private share percentage equals 0 will be dropped. Because when we look 
into SOEs’ privatization in a Chinese context, it is still an on-going case which means majority 
of SOEs may not have private share percentage yet. However, in order to study the influence 
of increasing private share percentage by using econometric method, we should avoid those 
huge amount of non-private share SOEs’ effect on entire sample size. 
 
Control Variables In order to hold for exogenous effects and make model better furthermore 
as extent of, soft budget constraints, a number of control variables also will be added. According 
to the previous research and common sense, this study inspected into the crude dataset and kept 
some variables that would have significant influences on state-owned enterprises’ operating 
efficiency beside private share percentage. These included control variables will be of does 
your company have a board of directors, major type of activity, which city your company is 
located, the year your company established, the size of the firm.  
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Does a state-owned enterprise have a board of directors is an important dummy variables 
which along with property right theory and budget constraint theory. If a SOE has a board of 
directors, their business choice will become more market oriental. Shareholders will always 
find way to maximize their profits meanwhile facing relatively hard budget constrain. Therefore, 
board as an important control variable is added in this study. 
 
Major type of activity as sectors that SOEs deal with is chosen to be added in our model. 
Sector will serve as a relevant indicator for the Chinese privatization, for instance the central 
government liberalized the consumer goods industries (food and textile) faster and earlier than 
industrial goods industries (petroleum products and processing). As a consequence, industries 
of consumer goods has been facing a more intense competition with prices which set by the 
market whereas industrial goods industry has largely been maintained under a dual price track 
system of official and market pricing systems (Park et al 2006). Since the firms belong to 
various sector, they might enjoy different profit-making opportunities as certain sectors and 
industries are associated with different levels of state intervention and promotion (Nee et al 
2007).  
 
Which city your company is located is served as a categories variable in order to control for 
which city the state-owned enterprises are operating in. According to a vast of previous 
researches, city is often employed and control for as it has been argued to be obviously affected 
by the political and economic institutions of China, and has a further influence on firm 
performance especially for state-owned enterprises. Moreover, regional political and economic 
polices has played an important role in determining SOEs’ operating efficiencies. For instance, 
Shanghai in a southern China, as well as the Special Economic Zones, has initiated more 
liberalized economic policies, which allows companies greater freedom resulting in greater 
performance records. Thus, it can be expected that firms in coastal regions tend to outperform 
firms in other regions due to preferential policies and favorable economic infrastructures (Li 
1998). 
 
The year state-owned companies are established which is defined as firm age in this paper. 
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Some scholars think that, the earlier a SOE is established, the heavier policy burden it is likely 
to carry and since various Chinese reforms have taken place throughout the country’s transition 
and affecting performance, firm age will thus help control for organizational structure and 
institutional environment at the time of founding (Lin, Cai and Li 1998). However, 
accompanying with the age growth, firms can obtain profit accumulations to reinforce their 
operating system and manage system. Plus, those SOEs that have been established for many 
years may have more possibility to partially have private share percentage. Furthermore, age 
should also be controlled for as the Chinese SOEs underwent large-scale restructuring and 
labor-shedding in the mid 1990’s, when the opportunity for laying off workers was opened 
(Dong and Xu 2009). In addition, the correlation of firm age with SOEs’ operating efficiency 
may not simply be linear, thus I generate a polynomial term of firm age to get a better regression 
model.  
 
Another control variable is the size of the firm, as commonly used measure of firm size, I 
pick total employment of SOEs in 2004. The central government is very likely to be more 
inclined to support or bail out larger firms of more importance, in line with the notion of some 
firms which relate to core political target being “too big to fail”. However, it must be 
acknowledged that surplus labor in large scale of SOEs might also cause some inefficient 
operation, therefore, smaller firms usually have lower costs of production, giving these firms 
the ability to outperform larger firms in terms of profitability (Li 1998)  
4.5 Model Specification and Variables Description 
The hypothesis of private share percentage growth’s influence of SOEs’ operating efficiency 
which developed in the previous section will be tested using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method, estimating the sample regression function that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. 
These two OLS regression models regarding with the nature of the relationship between factors 
given above with sale efficiency and income efficiency as dependent variables are in the 
following specification: 
sale/income_efficiency = 𝑓(private, board, size, city, age, age2, sector) 
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Model1:
 sale efficiency=α+β1privateshare+β2age+β3age2+β4sector+β5city+β6size+β7board+μi 
Model2:
 income efficiency=α+β1privateshare+β2age+β3age2+β4sector+β5city+β6size+β7board+μi 
Where α is constant, β is coefficients of each independent variables and control variables, μi 
is residuals. 
                         Table 3 Variables Description 
Dependent Variables 
Sale efficiency                                           sale per employee 
Income efficiency                                   net income per employee 
                         Independent Variable 
Private_share                                percentage of private ownership 
Control Variables 
board                                   do company have a board of director 
size                                             total employment in 2004 
age                                       firm established year minus 2004 
city                                           which city the firm located in  
sector                                       major type of activities of firm 
age2                                          polynomial term of firm age 
  
After specifying testing model and variables description, summary of the variables are as 
follow: 
Table 4 Summary statistics Clients  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Sale efficiency 53 30.05073 35.2565 0 185.9019 
Income efficiency 53 12.60837 48.6334 -51.0061 332.5135 
Independent Variable 
Private share 53 58.01887 31.1484 1   98.9 
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Given two tables above shows that sale efficiency and net income efficiency are two 
dependent variables which include sale per employee and income per employ of state-owned 
enterprises in 2004. The mean sale efficiency among all the SOEs is 30.05073 (thousand 
yuan/employee) in SOEs which have private share percentage in 2004. The maximum sale 
efficiency is 185.9 (thousand yuan/employee) and the minimum sale efficiency is 0 
(yuan/employee) which is a outlier but I chose to keep it. In my opinion those outliers have a 
tiny impact on what we are interested in.The mean yearly income efficiency is 12.6 (thousand 
yuan/employee) in SOEs which have private share percentage in 2004. The maximum yearly 
income efficiency is 332.5 (thousand yuan/employee) and the minimum yearly income 
efficiency is minus 51 (thousand yuan/employee). In this dataset, some SOEs which partially 
owned by individuals have negative income efficiency. This phenomenon is allowed mainly 
due to debt or something else that block company’s performance. From this stastical summary 
of operating efficiency we can notice that except for some extreme outliers, the mean sale 
efficiency which equals 30.05 thousand yuan per person and income efficiency which equals 
12.6 thousand yuan per person in 2004 of state-owned enterprises is reasonable. 
 
Where private_share as our crucial independent variable which includes private share 
percentage of state-owned enterprise. It is a continuous variable. The mean private percentage 
in state-owned comepanies which have private ownership is 58%. The maximum private share 
is 98.9% which I think ought to be considered as private onership arrangement to some degree. 
External control Variables 
Board 
(dummy,yes=0 
no=1) 53 0.584906 0.49745 0 1 
Size 53 3138.566 7769.71 12    52986 
Age 53 28.98113 19.7323 2 85 
Age2 53 1221.925 1367.68 4 7225 
City 
(category) 53 17.83019 10.8392 1    37 
Sector 
(category) 53 8.037736 
      
3.57320         4          7225 
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However, when we are dealing with Chinese dataset, some times such things happens. The 
minimum private share is 1% in SOEs. Notice that, in this study we only focus on those SOEs 
that have private shares, thus the minimum private share could not be 0. From statical summary 
of private share percentage, we can find that if a state-owned enterprise has private ownership 
(which includes manager holders, public share, other individual share), usually it will be half 
or even more among its total share. 
 
    Where board is one of the external control variables. It is a dummy variable which includes 
0 and 1. 0 stands for the state-owned companiey does have a board of directors, 1 stands for no 
it does not have one. Given table above shows that among those SOEs have private share 
percentage there are 22 of them have a board of directors. While 31 of the total dataset do not 
have a board of directors. 
 
Where firm size is measured by the total employment of the state-owned company in 2004. 
The mean employment in SOEs is 3138 employee. The minimum number of employment in 
SOEs is 12 and the maximum is 52986. From this statistical summary of firm size we can see 
that after a tremendous scale of lay-off in state-owned enterprises during mid-1990s, the 
average size of SOEs still relatively bigger that other types of companies in China.  
 
Another control variable is the age of the company. The mean age of SOEs is 28 years. The 
minimum age is 2 years and the maximum age is 85. However, the correlation of age is not 
simply linear so I generated a new variable age2 which is age squared to give a better 
explanation of my model. As can be seen from statistical summary of firm age, the average age 
of these SOEs more or less have been trough Chinese SOEs reform, therefore, theories about 
SOEs privatization can be suitably used in this study. 
 
In which city to operate a company is also very important. According to the statistical 
summary above, there are 37 different cities we use in this dataset. Among them, we have first 
level cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and for second level we have 
Chongqing, Tianjin, Wuhan and so forth. Notice that, aforementioned SOEs which have huge 
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size are more likely to operate in first level cities and coastal cities. 
 
Sector as the last control variable is presented here. According to the industry code from 
National Bureau Statistics of China, here we use a generally separated sector to run the 
regression, there are 14 types of industries these SOEs are involved which from agricultural 
and sideline foods processing to waste resources and old material recycling and processing. 
Although it might only has slight impacts, I still want to keep it in my model as a control 
variable in order to get better explaination. 
5. Analyses and Result 
5.1 Bivariate Analyses  
Before proceeding to the multiple regressions of this research，given all the variables, I 
hereby present the bivariate analyses between private share percentage and sale efficiency, and 
private share percentage and income efficiency, and other control variables, respectively. 
             Table 5. Bivariate analyses of private share percentage 
Correlat pwcorr Private share percentage 
Sale efficiency 0.0521 
Income efficiency 0.1824 
As we mentioned before, given table 5 above is the predicted correlations between private 
share percentage and sale efficiency and income efficiency. According to this picture, we can 
see that with private percentage grows up both sale and income efficiency have a significantly 
positive influence. The degree of correlation between sale efficiency and private share 
percentage is 0.0521 and the degree of correlation between income efficiency and private share 
percentage is 0.1824. This prediction matchs those previous theories, SOE’s operating 
efficiency will be deeply accelerated from both inputside and output side due to increasing in 
private share percentage. When transform froma soft budget constraint to a hard budget 
constraint state-owned enterprises are pressed to improve operating efficiency so that they can 
maximize sales proceeds and income. 
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Table 6. Bivariate analyses of board 
Correlat pwcorr Board 
Sale efficiency -0.1606 
Income efficiency 0.0592 
As far as I’m concerned, in state-owned enterprises the director of board tends to act more 
as a supervisory role, and individual responsibility and management more likely to be given 
downward to individual professional executives (such as a general manager) who deal with 
specific areas of the firm's affairs. Therefore, I assume that whether SOEs have a board has a 
significant impact on their operating efficiency in both side. Above table 6 shows that the degree 
of correlation between sale efficiency and board is -0.1606 and the degree of correlation 
between income efficiency and board is 0.0592. Surprisingly, board seems to have negative 
influence on sale efficiency in this prediction. According to this picture, we can see that if a 
SOE has a board of directors it will have a negetive influence on its sale efficiency. However, 
a SOE which has a board of directors has better income efficiency compare to those do not have. 
Table 7. Bivariate analyses of firm size 
Correlat pwcorr Firm size 
Sale efficiency 0.3311 
Income efficiency 0.0287 
According to correlation which are predicted in above table 7, the degree of correlation 
between sale efficiency and firm size is 0.3311 and the degree of correlation between income 
efficiency and firm size is 0.0287. This bivariate analyses generally matches my assumption 
that the size of a firm also has a positive impact on its operating efficiency. The bigger size one 
enterprise has, the more sale/income efficiency can they have. 
Table 8. Bivariate analyses of firm age 
Correlat pwcorr Firm age 
Sale efficiency 0.0444 
Income efficiency -0.1634 
Given figure above show the predicted correlation between state-owned enterprise’s age and 
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its operating efficiency. The degree of correlation between sale efficiency and firm age is around 
0.0444 and the degree of correlation between income efficiency and firm age is -0.1634. The 
established year for companies might also has correlation with operating efficiency. As far as 
I’m concerned, accompanying with the age growth, firms can obtain profit accumulations to 
reinforce their operating system and manage system. Plus, those SOEs that have been 
established for many years may have more possibility to partially have private share percentage.  
It can be seen that the age of SOEs has positive influence on its sale efficiency. However, it has 
negative impact on SOEs’ income efficiency.  
Table 9. Bivariate analyses of firm age2 
Correlat pwcorr Firm age2 
Sale efficiency 0.1334 
Income efficiency -0.0970 
 Given table above shows that along with previous analysis, firm age2 as the polynamial term 
of firm age also has a positive influence on sale efficiency and negative impact on income 
efficiency. The degree of correlation between sale efficiency and firm age2 is 0.1334 and the 
degree of correlation between income efficiency and firm age2 is -0.0970.  
Table 10. Bivariate analyses of city 
Correlat pwcorr City 
Sale efficiency 0.0941 
Income efficiency 0.1309 
Usually, more developed city has higher level of infrastructure, better property rights 
protection and more incentive policies which facilitate SOEs to have private share and better 
operating efficiency. For instance, I assume that SOEs in Beijing and Shanghai are more 
efficient than other SOEs in developing cities when running a business. As a result, these 
advanced cities have positive impact on operating efficiency. Therefore, I use city as a control 
variable. According to given table 10 above, the degree of correlation between sale efficiency 
and city is 0.0941 and the degree of correlation between income efficiency and city is 0.1309. 
Table 11. Bivariate analyses of sector 
Correlat pwcorr Sector 
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Sale efficiency 0.2260 
Income efficiency 0.1324 
Different industry a state-owned enterprise has might also lead to different percentage of 
private share requirement. What’s more different sector will also have different treatment from 
the central government. Some core industries are more like to obtain policy support. In my 
opinion, sector has significant influence on SOEs’ operating efficiency. Based on table 11 above 
we can see that the degree of correlation between sale efficiency and sector equals 0.2260 which 
is relatively high and the degree of correlation between income efficiency and sector is 0.1324. 
 
5.2 Model Estimation and Hypothesis Result 
Model Estimation 
Before showing and discussing the results of the OLS model estimation further, a note on the 
diagnostic status of the model is needed. Several diagnostic tests have been conducted in order 
to ensure the appropriateness of using the model, testing for omitted variable, absence of 
multicollinearity, and heteroskedasticity. Results for these test can be seen in Appendix tables 
below, a link test was performed to exam whether these two models are suffer from omitted 
variable or not. As the P-value of hat in both regressions is 0 in a 1% significance level, they 
are not suffer from omitted variable. These models also did not show signs of multicollineraity 
as the mean of variance inflation factors (VIF) varied between 2.35 to 2.37. Notice that, at first 
time two regressions did suffer from multicollineraity problem due to the introduction of 
polynomial term of firm age. What’s more, the using of age squared does not significantly 
improve the levels of significance nor improve the adjusted r-squared. Therefore, I dropped 
age2 to avoid multicollineraity problem and to improve testing models. The Breusch -Pagan 
LM test was performed on the two models resulting in that two models can not reject the null 
hypotheses of no heteroskedasticity.  
 
Hypothesis Result and Discussion 
Given table 12 below presents a summary of the regression results with two extra tables in 
Appendix providing a more detailed presentation of the estimated coefficients. 
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Table 12 Results of OLS Regression Analysis 
OLS of SOE operating efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable                        Sale efficiency     Income efficiency 
Private share percentage        0.1964** 
       (0.3106)          
       1.7372*** 
(0.3306) 
External control variables 
Board 8.4796* 
(16.22) 
78.759*** 
(17.267) 
Firm size 0.0047* 
(0.0026) 
0.0056* 
(0.0028) 
          Firm age        3.4246**               
(2.2260) 
1.1080** 
(2.3697) 
City1 
(full content see in Appendix) 
       -22.76951** 
(2.925346) 
(results shorted here) 
-111.3126** 
(44.14635)  
(results shorted here) 
Sector1 
(full content see in Appendix) 
      26.72116** 
(5.263145) 
(results shorted here) 
330.9164** 
(42.40203)  
(results shorted here) 
Constant        -58.976 
       (57.731) 
-190.61** 
(61.458) 
Observations 53 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.631 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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According to the regression result above, we can observe that Adjust R-squared values are 
relatively high in both models which means these two models are statistically convincible. For 
model1 sale efficiency side, the P-value of our independent variable private share percentage is 
less than 0.05 which means that its coefficient is statistically significant at 95% confidence level. 
Moreover considering the Adjust R-squared value of the entire model is 0.3807 which is high 
enough and the slope coefﬁcient of the private share percentage is consistent with the 
hypothesized effects speciﬁed in H1. As I expected in research question part, the coefficient of 
private share percentage is positive 0.1964 which means that 1% increasing in state-owned 
enterprises’ private share percentage will lead to 0.1964(thousand yuan/per worker) increasing 
in SOEs’ sale efficiency. Regarding the Chinese context, I would say that almost two hundred 
yuan annual sale growth per worker is absolutely a significant positive influence.  
 
The P-values of board variable in model1 is less than 0.1 which means its coefficients are 
statistically significant at 90% confidence level. Along with my expectation, it is shown that if 
a state-owned enterprise has a board of directors will increase more 8.4796(thousand yuan/per 
woker) in sale efficiency than those SOEs don’t have. In addition, compare to the bivariate 
analyses of board which shows a negative correlation between sale efficiency and the board of 
directors, in the final regression result board variable has a positive impact on sale efficiency. 
The P-values of firm size variable in model1 is less than 0.1 which means its coefficients are 
statistically significant at 90% confidence level. The coefficient of firm size equals positive 
0.0047 which means that 1 worker increasing will lead to 0.0047(thousand yuan/per worker) 
increasing in sale efficiency. This result is also consistent with my expectation and as we can 
see here though the coefficient of firm size is very slight, the positive influence of firm size on 
sale efficiency is definitely statistically significant. The P-values of control variable firm age in 
model1 is statistically significant at 95% significant level which equals less than 0.05. Hence, 
the coefficient of firm age equals positive 3.4246 which means that 1 year age increasing will 
lead to 3.4246 (thousand yuan/per worker) increasing in state-owned enterprises’ sale 
efficiencies. For the city categories with Zhengzhou as omitted variable and reference category 
most of the cities report significant coefficients and mainly along with my expectation. For the 
cities which more is more developed than Zhengzhou such as Beijing and Tianjin, their state-
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owned enterprises are incline to have better sale efficiency. And as I know Zhengzhou is one of 
the industrial cities in China, compare to some less developed cities like Lanzhou and Guilin, 
SOEs in Zhengzhou will have better sale efficiency. This result supports that more developed 
city has higher level of infrastructure, better property rights protection and more incentive 
policies which facilitate SOEs to have private share and better operating efficiency. From the 
dummy variables of sector, we can observe that, with nonmetal mineral products as omitted 
variable and reference category, most of the sectors report significant coefficients and mainly 
along with my expectation. For instance, SOE which deal with beverage production has 
81.73(thousand yuan/per worker) more sale efficiency than nonmetal mineral production 
companies. In general, though the independent variable has relatively slight positive influence 
on SOEs’ sale efficiency, the P-value is less than 0.05 shows that it is still consistent with my 
null hypothesis 1 that growth of private share percentage improves state-owned companies’ sale 
efficiency. Considering Adjust R-squared value is 0.3807 which illustrates model1 has high 
explantory power, thus I can not reject my null hypothesis H1. For the slight influence on sale 
efficiency problem of private share percentage could mainly due to the sample size is too small 
that consider with Chinese context, state-owned enterprises seldom have private share 
percentages. 
 
 For model2 income efficiency side, we obtained an even higher explanatory power 
regression with Adjust R-squared value which equals 0.631. The P-values of our independent 
variable private share percentage is less than 0.01 which means its coefficient is statistically 
significant even at 99% confidence level. The coefficient of private share percentage is positive 
1.7372 which means that 1% increasing in state-owned enterprises’ private share percentage 
will lead to 1.7372(thousand yuan/per worker) increasing in SOEs income efficiency. 
Comparing to model1, the coefficient in model two is relatively greater which shows private 
share percentage has more positive impact on income efficiency.  
 
Most of the control variables in model2 are significant. The P-values of board variable in 
model2 is less than 0.01 which means its coefficients are statistically significant at 99% 
confidence level. Along with my expectation, it is shown that if a state-owned enterprise has a 
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board of directors will increase more 78.759 (thousand yuan/per woker) in income efficiency 
than those SOEs don’t have. Comparing to model1’s 8.4796(thousand yuan/per woker) in sale 
efficiency here we can see, in income efficiency side whether a SOE has a board of directors is 
more important than sale efficiency side. The P-values of firm size variable in model2 is less 
than 0.1 which means its coefficient is statistically significant at 90% confidence level. The 
coefficient of firm size equals positive 0.0056 which means that 1 worker increasing will lead 
to 0.0056 (thousand yuan/per worker) increasing in sale efficiency. Again this result is also 
consistent with my expectation and as we can see here the coefficient of firm size in model2 is 
also very slight but the positive influence of firm size on income efficiency is definitely 
statistically significant. Another control variable firm age’s P-values in model2 is statistically 
significant at 95% significant level which equals less than 0.05. Hence, the coefficient of firm 
age equals positive 1.1080 which means that 1 year age increasing will lead to 1.1080 (thousand 
yuan/per worker) increasing in state-owned enterprises’ income efficiencies. For the city 
dummies in model2, I also use Zhengzhou as omitted variable and reference category. Most of 
the cities report significant coefficients and mainly along with my expectation. Compare to first 
level cities, state-owned enterprises in Zhengzhou has less income efficiency. However, some 
cities which are less developed than Zhengzhou have less income efficiency. For the dummy 
variables of sector, the nonmetal mineral products is still used as omitted variable and reference 
category. Coefficients of different sectors are mainly statistically significant. Therefore 
considering the combination of the Adjust R-squared value 0.631 and the P-values of our 
independent variable private share percentage is less than 0.01 in model2, income efficient 
model’s result can not reject the null hypothesis 2 that growth of private share percentage is 
conducive to state-owned companies’ income efficiency.  
 
In addition, in these two models please notice that control variable age was insignificant in 
both regression when with age2 together, because of multicollinearity problems. Therefore 
aforementioned polynomial term of age is excluded artificially in both regressions. Similar 
matters also happened in variable sets of sector dummies, four sectors were omitted by STATA 
due to collinearity. The entire regression results with full set of dummies is presented in the 
Appendix. 
 37 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
My initial motivation was to dig into the dynamics that how private share percentage in SOE 
affect its operating efficiency. In order to do so, I chose the scope to look at the correlations 
between private share percentage, sale efficiency and income efficiency. By presenting the 
overview and current state of SOEs in China, I addressed the importance of studies on SOEs 
reform. And to be more specific, conduct a quantitative way to research on one aspect of 
privatization of Chinese state-owned enterprises (increasing of private share percentage). While 
due to the limitation of dataset accessibility and accuracy, only state-owned enterprises which 
have private share percentage in 2004 were studied. This thesis is defined as the analysis on 
domestic micro-data instead of group or macro-level data which cross countries, the variables 
and figures are still relatively narrow as to study private share percentages’ impact on SOEs’ 
operating efficiency in a global context. Therefore, the thesis has limitations on both data source 
and study scope. In other word, my result can only focus on phenomenon explanation rather 
than analyze entire institutional reform. The content of research is further narrowed down to 
the base number of SOEs is comparatively larger than target SOEs (those have private share 
percentage). The scale of sample size directly relate to the applied range of empirical testing 
result. That is to say, sometimes the final outcome might be a little bit over fitted.  
 
Accordingly, I have initiated the key research question to investigate the impact of private 
share percentage on SOEs’ operating efficiency in China. I have found that most of the initially 
assumed variables have strong or significant correlations with the operating efficiency such as 
whether SOEs have a board of directors, firm’s size, firm’s age and so forth. Especially for the 
independent variable, private share percentage has significantly positive influence on both sale 
efficiency and income efficiency in state-owned enterprises. Thus I can not reject my null 
hypothesis that private share percentage has positive impact on state-own enterprises’ operating 
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efficiency in China. This result is conducive to those opinions which support reforms in state-
owned enterprises in China. As the private degree in SOEs raising, the operating efficiency also 
grows up. According to the statistical analysis, operating efficiency is significantly higher when 
a SOE has more private share percentage. It means growth of private share percentage improved 
operating efficiency without demanding any costs on SOEs’ output, profitability, input and so 
forth. This result was interpreted along with the budget constraint perspective. As far as I’m 
concern, if SOEs want to get better performance in the future, they should have more private 
share percentage and a board of directors as well. 
 
SOEs in China are always face with soft budget constraints, and as a consequence, the 
inefficiency of the company was embedded in the structure. However, in this paper I found that 
growth of private share improved operating efficiency significantly. Thus, it might be that the 
growth of private share hardened the budget constraint and it affected SOEs’ economic 
performance. The budget constraint is hard if persistent loss is a matter of life and death; the 
more the loss maker is spared from tragic consequences, the softer is the constraint. General 
Managers perceive increasing private share percentage as a threat which can block all sources 
of the soft budget constraint. Those sources can be explained as the rent of SOEs, and the 
interest groups try hard to maintain it. The softening is that the decision maker expects such 
external financial assistance with high probability, and this probability is built firmly into his 
behavior. Such rent-seeking behaviors generally created corruption or illegal activities in the 
past, but it can also be a good incentive to operation efficiently in good anti-corruption, and this 
incentive strongly activates under the growth of private share percentage.  
 
From this single perspective, the central government should continue with increasing SOEs’ 
private share percentage instead of keeping the largest and most important SOEs under control. 
However, we couldn’t simply draw a conclusion that comprehensive privatization in Chinese 
SOEs is the only way to solve SOEs’ inefficient problem. As many scholars said, privatization 
is not the only method to bring about changes in managerial goals and towards competitive 
environment, if we want to figure out the whole institutional change method, we need to take 
more factors into account for instance public choice, agency theory, interest group theory and 
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so forth. Furthermore, from many previous studies we can learn the fact that the companies 
with higher efficiency may have been more efficient even before they became subject to SOE. 
For instance, as many studies pointed out that private companies are more efficient than SOEs. 
Therefore, we also need to be aware of this adverse selection problem. Based on my outcomes 
state-owned enterprises’ reform seems to be accomplished by more gradual approaches, due to 
the influence of private share percentage on sale and income efficiency side is around a 
relatively slight degree. In addition, my study has time and dataset limitations which only can 
be focused on a small scale of SOEs, with time passing on, more and more researches need to 
be done in relevant aspects by using more recent data source and larger scale of SOEs in China.  
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Appendix 
Table 1 omitted variable test of sale efficiency model 
Linktest 
Sale efficiency Coefficients Std Err t P-values 
_hat 0.9688115 0.1287779 7.52 0.000 
_hatsq 0.0002179 0.0008234 0.26 0.792 
_cons 0.5062728 2.99965 0.17 0.867 
Adj R-squared 
0.8763 
Number of obs 
53 
Root MSE 
12.4 
  
 
 
Table 2 omitted variable test of income efficiency model  
Linktest 
Income 
efficiency 
Coefficients Std Err t P-values 
_hat 0.6308802 0.0675681 9.34 0.000 
_hatsq 0.0015042 0.0002475 6.08 0.000 
_cons 1.171867 1.438728 0.81 0.419 
Adj R-squared 
0.9576 
Number of obs 
53 
Root MSE 
10.017 
  
 
 
Table 3 variable multicollinearity test (VIF test) 
 Mean VIF 
Sale efficiency model 2.37 
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Income efficiency model 2.35 
 
 
 
Table 5 heteroskedasticity test of income efficiency model 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of income_eff 
Chi2(1) 3.77 
Prob>chi2 0.0522 
 
 
Table 6 heteroskedasticity test of sale efficiency model  
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of sale_eff 
Chi2(1) 2.87 
Prob>chi2 0.0900 
 
Table 7 Regression results, including full set of city-dummies and sector-dummies 
OLS of SOE operating efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable                        Sale efficiency     Income efficiency 
Private share percentage        0.1964** 
       (0.3106)          
       1.7372*** 
(0.3306) 
External control variables 
Board 8.4796* 
(16.22) 
78.759*** 
(17.267) 
Firm size 0.0047* 
(0.0026) 
0.0056* 
(0.0028) 
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          Firm age        3.4246**               
(2.2260) 
1.1080** 
(2.3697) 
City 
Beijing 43.79417** 
(1.598249) 
63.60775 
(38.02217) 
Benxi -9.724651 
(3.779988) 
45.5766 
(45.16841) 
Chengde -22.76951** 
(2.925346) 
-111.3126** 
(44.14635) 
Chengdu -113.9734*** 
(2.200028) 
-99.49117** 
(44.12623) 
Chongqing -118.1934*** 
(2.355035) 
-144.149*** 
(44.92622) 
Chuzhou -40.40978** 
(1.917247) 
-40.41642 
(40.72026) 
Datong -16.39393** 
(1.790974) 
-56.06732* 
(29.48084) 
Guangzhou 60.07594** 
(1.726448) 
-8.326633 
(37.464) 
Guilin 47.06566** 
(1.889489) 
-47.64687 
(28.28788) 
Guiyang 37.6947** 
(2.160723) 
9.685263 
(32.78151) 
Haerbing -4.105278 
(1.710317) 
-19.10843 
(39.81724) 
Handan 129.9602*** 
(2.849986) 
35.34258 
(46.922) 
Hengyang -23.18572** -102.515** 
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(2.860705) (42.15429) 
Huanggang 23.95449*** 
(23.95449) 
12.90824 
(46.93509) 
Jinan 37.44528*** 
(37.44528) 
63.30057 
(42.79107) 
Jingzhou 52.49475*** 
(2.239658) 
101.9819** 
(39.11414) 
Kunming 145.6765*** 
(4.797156) 
-85.60912* 
(43.53407) 
Lanzhou -12.67015** 
(1.560728) 
1.873024 
(40.19756) 
Luoyang -258.4633*** 
(3.361096) 
-54.35393 
(52.74992) 
Maoming 75.44737*** 
(2.224382) 
13.61538 
(47.91861) 
Nanchang 42.28749*** 
(3.7574) 
-88.21836** 
(36.82201) 
Nanjing 28.45645** 
(2.933095) 
-11.42461 
(45.2872) 
Qujing 8.883216* 
(2.2767) 
163.6542*** 
(31.42687) 
Shangqiu 13.44246** 
(1.909765) 
47.25591 
(40.81312) 
Shenyang 32.15769*** 
(1.903048) 
-4.25478 
(31.96754) 
Shijiazhuang 17.74497** 
(2.71625) 
-68.5318 
(42.67986) 
Tangshan 276.8844*** 
(4.893856) 
89.58325 
(70.68893) 
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Tianjin 22.20062*** 
(2.144686) 
-41.56327 
(32.34026) 
Tianshui 25.9086** 
(3.1874) 
-135.4664*** 
(35.39101) 
Weifang 27.72189*** 
(2.39754) 
-23.59237 
(45.08895) 
Xi’an 113.782*** 
(1.727798) 
-7.48458 
(40.72434) 
Xianyang 73.92255*** 
(2.888837) 
9.197159 
(46.14543) 
Xuzhou -4.804994* 
(1.62534) 
1.327968 
(37.97302) 
Zhengzhou 32.99824* 
(2.24297) 
-34.68642 
(30.99895) 
Zibo 108.6679*** 
(1.98106) 
45.54446 
(38.61417) 
Zunyi 80.0781*** 
(2.46517) 
-36.10043 
(46.06378) 
Sector 
Textile Industry -69.33957*** 
(1.861146)          
-13.57791 
(14.99415) 
Chemical Products -14.11091** 
(1.48402) 
-30.12303 
(11.95587) 
Medical products 81.73253*** 
(2.942181) 
33.21141 
(23.70341) 
Nonmetal Mineral Products -36.76195*** 
(1.226656) 
-27.17854 
(9.882436) 
Smelting of Ferrous Metals -67.22919*** -24.94104 
 47 
 
(2.377407) (19.15336) 
Smelting of Non-ferrous Metals 26.72116** 
(5.263145) 
330.9164** 
(42.40203) 
Ordinary Machinery Manufacturing 53.72494*** 
(1.920272) 
18.43071 
(15.47049) 
Special Equipment Manufacturing -54.53695*** 
(1.122459) 
-22.75233 
(9.042987) 
Transport Equipment Manufacturing -26.27187*** 
(1.492628) 
-10.4117 
(12.02522) 
Constant        -58.976 
       (57.731) 
-190.61** 
(61.458) 
Observations 53 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.631 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Sector beverage production, leather and related products, electric machines and 
apparatuses manufacturing, communications equipment, computer and other electronic 
equipment manufacturing were omitted by STATA due to collinearity. 
